Our role-based/mandatory access control (RBAC/MAC) security model and enforcement framework for inter-operating legacy, COTS, GOTS, databases, servers, etc., limits: who (user/user role) can invoke which methods (based on value and MAC level) of artifact APIs at what times, and who (user) can delegate which responsibility (user role) at what times. In this chapter, we focus on assurance for the timeframe of access (of a user to a role, of a role to a method, etc.) and the attainment of the Simple Security Property (i.e., a subject cannot read information for which it is not cleared) and Simple Integrity Property (i.e., a subject is limited to writing information at its own level and lower), which together can be used to support safety and liveness.
Introduction
As agencies continue to assemble software artifacts (i.e., legacy, COTs, GOTS, databases, clients, servers, etc.), into interoperating applications, security assurance is critical [?, ?, ?, ?] . In the area of mandatory access control (MAC), assurance-related properties are: Simple Security Property, a subject can read information at the same or lower clearance level [?] ; Strict *-Property, a subject can only write information at exactly the level for which it is cleared [?] ; Liberal *-Property, a subject with a low clearance level can write to an object with the same or higher clearance level [?, ?] ; and Simple Integrity Property, a subject can write information at its own level and lower [?] . In addition, assurance must focus on application behavior with respect to its defined and realized security policy, to attain safety (nothing bad will happen to a subject or object during execution) [?] and liveness (all good things can happen to a subject or object during execution) [?] .
In this chapter, we explore assurance for our role-based/mandatory access control (RBAC/MAC) security model and enforcement framework for interacting software artifacts [?, ?, ?] . Our approach focuses on which methods of APIs can be invoked based on the security classification level of a role, the security clearance level of the user, and the values (parameters), time, and classification level of the method. Assurance guarantees are provided to insure that: a user (with one lifetime) playing a role (with another lifetime) can invoke a method (yet another lifetime) at the current time; the method invocation does not violate MAC domination (Simple Security for read-only and read-write methods, and Simple Integrity for read-write methods); and, a degree of safety (nothing bads happens when a user invokes a method) and liveness (all good things happen when a user invokes a method) is attained.
In the remainder of this chapter, Section 2 defines our RBAC/MAC security model. Section 3 focuses on the formal proofs of the security assurance guarantees for the available timeframe of method invocation and satisfaction of Simple Security and Simple Integrity Properties, leading to the attainment of safety and liveness. Section 4 concludes the chapter.
2.
A RBAC/MAC Security Model 
with unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S) , and top secret (T) forming a hierarchy: U < C < S < T ; clearance (CLR), the SLEVEL given to users; and, classification (CLS), the SLEVEL given to roles, methods, etc.
For assurance, LTs can guarantee that definition and access to privileges will always satisfy time limits. MAC will be used to guarantee the Simple Security and Integrity Properties [?, ?] .
Defs. 3 to 6 are for a distributed application of resources, services, and methods, with LTs and CLSs.
Def. 3: A distributed application, DAPPL, is composed of a set of software resources (e.g., a legacy, COTS, DB, etc.), R = {R i |i = 1..m}, each composed of services,
∈ SLEV EL (default U), and M P arams ijk parameters.
For assurance, we guarantee the dependencies that exist among the LTs (resource LT spans its services' LTs; service LT spans its resources' LT), and the minimality of CLS (resource CLS is minimum of its services' CLS; service CLS is the minimum of its methods' CLS). For examples, we use the U.S. Global Command and Control System (GCCS), with Figure ? ? containing Joint and Component services with (CLSs).
Defs. 7 to 18 involve the privilege specification process for user roles against resources, services, and methods.
Def. 7:
A user role U R = [U R N ame , U R LT , U R CLS ], represents a set of responsibilities, and has name U R N ame , LT U R LT (default [ct, ∞]), and U R CLS ∈ SLEV EL (default U). Def. 8: A user-role list, U RL = {U R i |i = 1..r}, has the r roles (Def. 7) for DAPPL.
For assurance, URs have specific LTs, used to check the "when" of access (i.e., can a user invoke a method at current time) and CLSs to check the "if " of access (i.e., does a UR's CLS dominate a method's CLS). For privileges, URs can be granted access to methods which have CLSs at or below the role's CLS (see Figure ?? ). Def. 9:
is an entity accessing a client, and has a unique U U serId , LT L LT (default [ct,∞]), and U CLR ∈ SLEV EL (default U). Def. 10: A user list, U L = {U i |i = 1..u}, has the u users (Def. 9) for DAPPL. For assurance, users have specific LTs for checking the "when" of access (i.e., can a user play a role at current time) and CLRs for checking the "if " of access (i.e., does a user's CLR dominate a UR's CLS). Representative users for GCCS are shown in Figure ? ?. Def. 11: A signature constraint, SC, is a boolean expression on M P arams ijk , for i = 1..m, j = 1..n, k = 1..g ij , to limit values. Def. 12: A time constraint, TC, is a LT (default [ct,∞]), and is utilized as follows: LTs of UR and method constrain the method assignment; LTs of UR, method, and user, constrain the method invocation; LTs of UR and user constrain the user authorization to the role; LTs constrain the time span of a delegation. Def. 13: A mandatory access control constraint, MACC, is the domination of the SLEVEL of one entity over another, e.g., U's CLR ≥ UR's CLS or UR's CLS ≥ M's CLS.
For assurance, we provide guarantees that a user playing a role can invoke a method limited by parameter values (SC -Def. 11), method availability (TC -Def. 12), and the Simple Security and Integrity Properties applied by a user against a role invoking a method (Def. 13).
The next set of definitions is for authorizations of method(s) to user role(s) and of user role(s) to user(s), to bring together all of the concepts. Figure ? ? has URAs for JPlanCR1, ArmyLogCR1, and ArmyLogCR2. Def. 15a: A r × q UR authorization matrix, URAM, where
is authorized to play UR (Def. 7) for time TC (Def. 12 -default [ct, ∞]) for when the role is available to U. Def. 17a: An r × u user authorization matrix, UAM, is:
For assurance, a valid URA (Defs. 14, 15a and 15b) can only be created if all required checks of a UR's capabilities against a M's characteristics are satisfied (i.e., TC and MACC checks), and the VURA then sets the criteria (UR, M, TC, SC) under which the invocation can occur. A corresponding set of guarantees also holds for a VUA. The remaining set of definitions are for role delegation [?]. Def. 19: A delegatable U R ∈ U RL, DUR, is eligible for delegation. Def. 20: The delegatable UR vector, DURV, ∀ r U Rs ∈ U RL is:
the UR via the security policy (∃ a VUA for the OU/UR, i.e., UAM(UR,OU) = 1), and not by a delegation. Def. 22: A delegated user, DU ∈ U L, is a user U that can be delegated a UR by an OU/DU (there is not a VUA for the DU/UR, i.e., U AM (U R, DU ) = 1)), where DU is not an OU for the same UR. Def. 23: The r × u user delegation/authorization matrix, UDAM, is:
For assurance, there must be guarantees on the capabilities of an OU with respect to the a DU to insure that LTs/TCs and CLS/CLR are consistent; the delegation is defined and checked at runtime. Def. 24: Delegation authority, DA, is given to OU for delegation of a DUR to another user. Def. 25: Pass-on delegation authority, PODA, is authority given to an OU/DU to pass on DA for a DUR to another OU/DU. Def. 26: The r × u delegation authority matrix, DAM, is:
2 U j has DA and PODA for U R i 1 U j has only DA for U R i 0 U R j has neither DA nor PODA for U R i Initially DAM has all 0 entries. For assurance, there must be DA and PODA guarantees; DA allows an OU/DU to delegate, and PODA, allows an OU/DU to pass on that delegation authority to another DU, which is a dangerous privilege.
Towards Assurance Guarantees
Security assurance is critical in our model to allow the consistency of URs, CLR/CLS levels, LTs, role delegations, user authorizations, etc., to be verified when the security policy is defined, changed, and executed. Towards that end: Section 3.1 examines assurance guarantees on the available time of access for a method invocation; Section 3.2 details the attainment of the Simple Security and Simple Integrity Properties for method invocations; leading to Section 3.3 which explores safety and liveness. Overall, we have been influenced by others [?, ?, ?, ?, ? ].
Time-Based Guarantees
To begin, we introduce available time, AT, which represents the maximum amount of time derived from various intersections of LTs and TCs of the authorizations for URs, OU, DU, and users, as given in Section 2. For example, U RA = [U R, M, T C, SC] involves LTs (for UR and M) and a TC, which must overlap to be a VURA. Formally, let Σ LT = ∩ alli Σ LT i , where each Σ LT i represents a LT or a TC, using intersection for LTs/TCs as given in Def. 1. Then, any time t is in the maximum available time, AT, or t ∈ ∩Σ LT i ∀ i ⇔ t ∈ Σ LT . To assist in the proofs, we define: Def. 1a: Let Compare(X, Y ) be a function that returns the overlap of LTs X and
Using Def. 1a, we offer lemmas for the ATs for URAs (Def. 14), URs (Def. 7), UAs (Def. 16), DUs (Def. 22) and Users (Def. 9).
1 By Defs. 14 and 15a, 
is a VURA where U RAM (U R, M j ) = 1 for some j = 1..q. Proof:
1 Consider URAM as given in Def. 15a. If U RAM (U R, M j ) = 0 for some j, then UR not authorized to M j , and there is no need to use this entry to calculate U R AT . 2 Consider all j where U RAM (U R, M j ) = 1 (VURA of UR to M). If ∃ at least one j s.t. U RAM (U R, M j ) = 1 and M LT = ∅, then set U R AT = ∅, and proof completes. 5 If U R AT ∩ ct = ∅, then U R AT = ∅ and proof completes.
2 By Lemma 2, U R AT is the AT of UR for all of its URAs. Apply Def. 1a with U A AT =Compare(U A AT , U R AT ). U A AT represents the time that U can engage an authorized UR.
3 By Def. 12, a TC is a LT. For U A = [U, U R, T C], apply Def. 1a with U A AT =Compare(U A AT ,T C). 5 DU A AT = OU A AT ∩DU AT since it is equivalent to DU A AT = DU A AT ∩ DU LT (by Step 3 of the proof and substituting for DU A AT on the r.h.s. with OU A AT ).
represents one VUA where U AM (U R j , U ) = 1 for some j = 1..r. This proof similar to Lemma 2 and omitted.
MAC Guarantees
Mandatory access controls are governed by strict rules for subjects (users) to access stored information or objects, and include many different properties: Simple Security Property [?], the Strict *-Property [?], the Liberal *-Property [?, ?] , and the Simple Integrity Property [?] . In this section, we prove that our RBAC/MAC model (see Section 2) satisfies both the Simple Security Property and the Simple Integrity Property as applied to methods, roles, and users. To do so, consider:
= {M RO ijk f or some k} and read-write methods,
Def. 28: Let Dominate(X, Y ) be a boolean function, with X and Y either CLR/CLS (Def. 2) with U < C < S < T .
Given these definitions, we present a series of lemmas on URAs, URs, and UAs in regards to the Simple Security and Integrity Properties. 
, where M CLS is the method's CLS. UR is the subject and M is the object. Defs. 14, 15a, and 15b) . 6. This is Simple Integrity (write-down/no-write-up) [?] . 
with U CLR . 3 Suppose that Dominate(U CLR , U R CLS ) = f alse. 4 Then, U AM (U R, U ) = 0 (Defs. 16, 17a, and 17b), which contradicts Step 2. 5 Thus, Dominate(U CLR , U R CLS ) = true (U CLR ≥ U R CLS ). 6 Since UR satisfies both Simple Security and Integrity Properties, UA also does. 
Safety and Liveness Guarantees
In this section, we explore safety (nothing bad will happen during a method invocation or delegation) [?] and liveness (all good can happen during a method invocation or delegation) [?] for our framework. We begin with a review of security assurance rules, SARs [?], which are logical statements that must be satisfied in order for a privilege to be set (design-time) or an action to be performed (runtime). The first four SARs are non-delegation checks at design time (Rule I for when an officer attempts to assign a method to a UR and Rule II for when an officer attempts to authorize a UR to a User) and runtime (Rule III for when a user selects a UR to play for a session and Rule IV for when a user attempts to invoke a method, via a client application).
Rule I: Let A ∈ U R and M be a method.
Theorem I: Rule I meets requirements for liveness and safety. Proof: 1 Let A be a user role and M a method being authorized. 2 Initially, the URAM is set to all 0s. This is perfect access control as there are no UR authorizations to any methods, M ijk , in this system. This meets safety (no bad things can happen), but not liveness, as no good things can happen. 3 Lemma 1 ensures that a URA is a VURA and U RA AT i = M LT ∩U R LT ∩T C. If U RA AT i = ∅ and U RA AT i ∩ct = ∅, then M can be assigned to UR. Otherwise M cannot be assigned to UR because it can never be available. 4 Lemma 6.1 insures A CLS ≥ M CLS . 5 To change an entry from 0 to 1 in a URAM, there must be a URA (Def. 14). 6 In order to build liveness, yet maintain safety, 0 entries in the URAM must be changed to 1 (U RAM (A, M ) = 1) for only those URs authorized to Ms (Defs. 15a and 15b). Validating changes to URAM allows for both safety and liveness; there is no access except for these specific authorizations and this is precisely Rule I.
Theorem II: Rule II meets requirements for liveness and safety. Proof: 1 Let X be a user and A be the role being authorized. 2 Initially, the UAM and UDAM are set to all 0s. This is perfect access control as there are no users, U, authorized to any user roles, UR, in this system. This meets safety requirements, but not liveness, as no user can do anything. 3 U and UR must be available for access and U R AT ∩U AT ∩ct = ∅. Lemma 3 insures the maximum AT for a U to a UR. The intersection with the current time assures that available time has not passed, which is obviously a requirement for use. 4 Lemma 7 insures X CLR ≥ A CLS . 5 To change an entry from 0 to 1 in UAM/UDAM, there must be a UA (Def. 16). 6 In order to build liveness, yet maintain safety, 0 entries in the UAM/UDAM must be changed. Validating changes to UAM and UDAM allows for both safety and liveness, as there is no access allowed except for these specific authorizations and this is precisely Rule II.
The safety/liveness of Theorems III/IV focuses on the runtime authorization of user to role, which is needed since the tranquility of CLR and CLS is not guaranteed, URs can change, and LTs and TCs can expire.
